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Initial Impressions of the Treasury Report
on Foundations
Marcus Schoenfeld*
V ERY RECENTLY the United States Treasury Department sub-
mitted its study of private foundations to Congress.' This
is the most recent development in an attempt to delineate the
proper role of foundations and their donors in our society, and
more particularly their proper tax treatment.2 Although it is
much too soon to predict the effect of the Treasury Report, since
Congress itself asked for the study,3 it is quite likely that some
more restrictive legislation will result.
4
The general tenor of the Treasury Report is one of modera-
tion. Although it discusses certain "problems" which have led
to serious abuses among a minority of foundations, it recognizes
that philanthropic activities of foundations have provided dis-
tinctive values to society which justify preferential tax treat-
ment:
Private philanthropy plays a special and vital role in
our society. Beyond providing for areas into which govern-
ment cannot or should not advance (such as religion), pri-
vate philanthropic organizations can be uniquely qualified
to initiate thought and action, experiment with new and un-
tried ventures, dissent from prevailing attitudes, and act
quickly and flexibly.5
* Assistant Professor of Law at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Bald-
win-Wallace College.
1 Treasury Department Report on Private Foundations, Comm. Print.,
Comm. on Finance, U. S. Senate 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 2, 1965). Here-
inafter this will be referred to as the "Treasury Report."
2 The present cycle probably began with an article in this law review:
Oleck, Foundations Used As Business Devices, 9 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 339
(1960). This article apparently led Congressman Patman to contact its
author about the problems discussed; and under Dean Oleck the problem
was studied at Cleveland-Marshall Law School for Congressman Patman's
Subcommittee. Although Dean Oleck resigned before the study was com-
plete, Congressman Patman continued and issued his now-famous Report
(see infra, note 6), which suggested basic reforms. In late 1963, the Senate
Finance Committee asked the Treasury to study the problems, and the
Treasury Report is the result of this study.
3 See Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 3.
4 Note that neither the House Ways and Means Committee nor the Senate
Finance Committee has held hearing or otherwise considered the matters
discussed in the Treasury Report. While some legislation is likely, there
will probably be some reasonably long period before it is enacted.
5 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 5.
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Therefore, rather than suggesting severe limitations on the
use of the foundation form, such as a maximum life," the Treas-
ury Report focuses on the specific problems and proposes specific
solutions for each.7 And since the federal tax laws have largely
caused the problems, the Treasury suggests that the best way to
curb abuses is to reframe those tax laws, rather than to create
some independent regulatory agency.8
The Report is specifically limited to "private foundations." 9
These are defined as any organization exempted from tax under
section 501 (c) (3),10 except churches, educational organizations,
public safety testing organizations, and all organizations which
normally receive substantial support from the general public or
some government body; and also includes all non-exempt trusts
which may make charitable contributions." As so limited, the
Treasury discovered six major and four minor problems. Each
of these will be discussed in turn. Then the shortcomings of
present law will be discussed. Finally, the Treasury's proposed
solutions will be discussed.
The Problems Discovered
Transactions between foundations and their donors. Except
for the so-called "prohibited transactions," 12 today foundations
may lawfully engage in transactions with their donors. Psycho-
logically this often tends to a view among donors and foundation
directors that a foundation is, in a sense, the donor's alter ego.
13
Practically, this can have profound effects on the affairs of both
the donor and the foundation. 14
6 Cf. "Tax-Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on
Our Economy," Chairman's Report to the Select Committee on Small Busi-
ness, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 133 (Dec. 31, 1962).
This, and the later reports of Oct. 16, 1963 and Mar. 20, 1964, will herein-
after be referred to as the "Patman Report."
7 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 13.
8 Id. at 14.
9 Id. at 3.
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 Sec. 501(c) (3) (as amended), 26 U. S. Code Sec.
501(c) (3). Hereinafter this will be cited as I. R. C. (1954); the citation to
U. S. Code will be omitted. See the author's article in the Spring 1965 vol-
ume of the Villanova Law Review for a discussion of organizations which
are exempt from tax under section 501.
11 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 3-4.
12 1. R. C. Secs. 503(c) and 681(b) (1954).
13 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 15.
14 Id. at 15-21.
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For example, the investment and distribution policies of the
foundation may be determined so as to best serve the needs of
the donor rather than the needs of charity. It may accumulate
income and keep corpus so that funds are readily available for
possible donor use, instead of disbursing the funds to further
charity; or the foundation's assets may be kept in liquid assets
to facilitate possible donor use, rather than in more appropriate
investments. In addition, the donor can be sure funds will be
available with a minimum of formality and on favorable terms
from a friendly lender. Furthermore, the donor may in effect
decrease the net cost of business investments by using the foun-
dation as a conduit.15
Delays in transmitting benefits to charity. There is often a
long delay between a charitable contribution (which confers an
immediate deduction upon the donor) and the actual entry of
those funds into the stream of charitable endeavor. Often the
contributions are added to capital, and only the income there-
from is devoted to charity. When even the income is not cur-
rently devoted to charity, clearly the justification for a charita-
ble deduction is weak.
It is useful to distinguish between "operating" private foun-
dations (which actively engage in or operate charitable activ-
ities) and "non-operating" private foundations (which fulfill
their purpose by dispensing funds to operating charities).16 Non-
operating private foundations which either accumulate income
or invest in non-income producing property are the primary
source of this delay. 17 Although the Code prohibits unreason-
able accumulations,' in fact there is often a considerable delay
15 For example, instead of contributing capital directly to his business
(corporate or otherwise), the donor contributes it to his foundation and
causes it to lend the funds to his business. Since this effects an increase in
business capital with before-tax dollars (because of the contributions de-
duction for the donor under I. R. C. Sec. 170 (1954)), the out of pocket cost
of a given dollar investment is reduced. The leverage increases as the
donor's bracket increases. While the foundation must eventually be repaid
by the business, the short-run advantages of before-tax investment greatly
outweigh this long-run factor.
16 Congress has recently recognized this distinction in the Revenue Act of
1964, P. L. 88-272, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. Sec. 209(e) (1964), which added Sec.
170(g) (2)(B) to the Code. While this section applies to the "unlimited" de-
duction, the Treasury adopts the same standard of "operating" and "non-
operating" in discussing the problem of delays in transmitting benefits to
charity. Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 23 n. 3.
17 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 23-26.
18 I. R. C. Secs. 504 and 681(c) (1954).
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between the original contribution and the actual use of the con-
tribution for charitable purposes.'9
Active involvement in business enterprises by foundations.
Many foundations have substantial investments in operating
businesses. 20 For these, assets which in theory are devoted to
charity, are in fact devoted to business. Such submersion of the
basic raison d'etre of foundations-social experimentation and
improvement-rob the form of much of its promise. The direc-
tors are often too concerned with business affairs to devote
proper time and efforts to charity. Since investment in business
may be made with pre-tax dollars, and since some income may
be received tax-free, 21 the foundation-controlled business has a
great competitive advantage over non-exempt business. In addi-
tion, the business operation often accentuates the previously
mentioned problems of self-dealing and delay of distribution, at
the expense of charity. Finally, in those situations where the
business is controlled by a foundation, there is little or no pres-
sure to pay dividends; not only does this delay charitable bene-
fits, but also by permitting profits to be "plowed back" it further
increases the advantage of tax-exemption in raising or increasing
capital.
Use of foundations to control closely-held property or corpo-
rations. Each of the aforementioned problems is further intensi-
fied whenever a foundation is used to maintain control of closely-
held property.22 For example, if the voting stock of a closely-
held corporation is donated to a foundation controlled by the
same group, effective control of the corporation is maintained,
income tax and gift tax deductions are available, and the stock
transferred is removed from the donor's estate (reducing the
estate tax). The remaining stock may be transferred to the next
generation at minimal estate or gift tax, since much of the equity
is in the foundation. But such minimal transfer in effect carries
control with it. The leverage effect increases as the proportion
of foundation stock ownership increases. In such instances, the
foundation is really just a device for minimizing taxes while de
19 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 25-26.
20 Id. at 30-36. See also, Patman Report No. 1, supra note 6, at 8 (1962).
21 By using the rental income exceptions of I. R. C. Sec. 514 (1954). See
Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 31-32 for examples.
22 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 37-41.
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facto control is unaffected. Since the unity of interest is main-
tained, it is not surprising that self-dealing exists; since the busi-
ness continues the foundation is necessarily involved in business;
and because of the control of dividend policy charity is delayed.
It should be noted that this device is one of the most fre-
quent abuses of the foundation form. Schemes such as this are
advertised as a "have your cake and eat it gimmick" with control
and tax-savings as the dominant motive, and charity as an after-
thought. 23
Financial transactions unrelated to charitable functions.
While foundations of necessity must engage in various financial
transactions, e.g., investing their funds, the Treasury notes three
types of transactions which are not essential to the charitable
ends of foundations and which can produce unfortunate results.24
For example, a foundation may borrow funds for many non-
charitable purposes, such as general investment. By amortizing
the purchase price with tax-free proceeds, it can acquire prop-
erty with little, if any, expenditure of its funds. This is often
called "bootstrapping" and can result in some transfer of the
benefit of tax exemption to the seller, since the foundation can
afford to pay a higher price than a non-exempt purchaser. And
this effect is heavily accentuated when the seller controls the
foundation and arranges a sale-and-leaseback with the founda-
tion.
On the other hand, the foundation may make loans which
have no relation to charity. Even if limited by a reasonable rate
of return,25 great private benefits may accrue, much as in self-
dealing.26
Finally, foundations have engaged in active trading of se-
curities, even to the point of speculation. Aside from the obvious
impropriety of such use of moneys supposedly devoted to char-
ity, the directors' time and effort which should be spent on fur-
thering charity is spent instead on playing the market.
Self-perpetuating foundation management. The final major
problem discovered by the Treasury is the problem of perpetual
life of foundations and the self-perpetuating parochial nature of
23 See for example May 7, 1960, Business Week at 153.
24 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 45-54.
25 See I. R. C. Secs. 503(c) (1) and 681(b) (2) (A) (1954).
26 See supra at note 14.
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foundation management. 27 Many of the values of private foun-
dations arise from the freshness of their approach. These tend
to diminish over time as its patterns become set and manage-
ment tends to ossify. Even if the donor retires or dies, control
of the foundation usually stays within his family or some other
small homogeneous group. The problem is especially serious
where the foundation has not been active in either operating or
financing charity, since a superfluous device is kept perpetually
alive.
Minor problems. Income, estate and gift tax deductions have
often been claimed for donations of unproductive property to
private foundations. Since the justification for the deduction is
the benefit bestowed on charity, if no benefit is obtained from
unproductive property it seems unreasonable to permit a present
deduction.
Many of the Code provisions which call for ordinary income
treatment of certain transactions-e.g., "preferred stock bail-
outs" 28 or "collapsible corporations" 29-can be avoided by judi-
cious use of foundations.8 " Since a contribution to charity is not
a realizable event for the donor, the remedial sections are not
triggered.31 Regardless of the merits of foundations, the Treas-
ury feels they should not be used as devices to avoid well-defined
tax policies. 3 2
The Treasury also notes that the interaction of the estate tax
provisions for the marital deduction,33 for charitable deduc-
tions,34 and for includability of property transferred subject to
the donor's control,3 5 is such as to give unintended benefits.
27 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 54-56.
28 1. R. C. Sec. 306 (1954).
29 1. R. C. Sec. 341 (1954).
30 See e.g., Lowndes, Tax Advantages of Charitable Gifts, 46 Va. L. Rev.
394, 413 (1960); Rudick and Gray, Bounty Twice Blessed: Tax Consequences
of Gifts of Property to or in Trust for Charity, 16 Tax L. Rev. 273, 280
(1961), for schemes to avoid the impact of section 306.
31 Cf. treatment of recaptured depreciation under I. R. C. Secs. 1245 and
1250 (1954) where I. R. C. Sec. 170(e) (1954) treats charitable contributions
as quasi-realizations, and reduces the amount of the deduction by the
amount that would have been realized as ordinary income if the property
had been sold.
32 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 60-63.
33 I. R. C. Sec. 2056 (1954).
34 I. R. C. Sec. 2055 (1954).
35 I. R. C. Secs. 2036 and 2038 (1954).
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That is, property which has been transferred to a foundation
which the donor controls is, in effect, "brought back" into his
gross estate long enough to increase the maximum potential
marital deduction and is then deducted in computing the taxable
estate.86 And similar "double" benefits exist with respect to
estate tax treatment of life insurance, transfers with retained
life estates, and transfers in contemplation of death.3 7
Finally, effective administration requires accurate informa-
tion. At present the sole penalty for failure to file the required
information return is quite severe.18 This very severity "makes
it inappropriate in most such cases." 39
Prior Attempts at Reform
None of the major problems discussed above is really new.
Congress considered them in 1950 and parts of the Revenue Act
of 195040 resulted. The present Treasury Report is designed to
determine whether the legislation has curbed the abuses or
whether further remedies are necessary.4 1
In general, the Treasury finds that the existing restrictive
legislation is not truly effective. It provides somewhat flexible
standards which courts have liberally interpreted and which are
administratively difficult to enforce. The Treasury therefore
suggests that more stringent standards be applied.
For example, the problem of self-dealing was treated by
adoption of rules regarding certain "prohibited transactions." 42
But each is phrased in terms of reasonableness or adequateness
or substantiality (e.g., ".... lends any part of its income or cor-
pus, without the receipt of adequate security and a reasonable
rate of interest . . .") .43 This standard is unrealistic because of
the conflicting interests of the donor; in fact, there cannot in fact
be an arm's length transaction between a donor and his founda-
36 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 63-64.
37 Ibid.
38 The general penalty for failure to file any required return is a fine of
not more than $10,000, or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both.
39 Treasury Report, sup-ra note 1, at 64.
40 P. L. 81-814, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950).
41 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 3.
42 Now in I. R. C. Secs. 503(c) and 681(b) (1954).
48 I. R. C. Sec. 503(c) (1) (1954).
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tion.44 It draws the analogy of dealings between a trustee and
a trust, where the impossibility of insuring fair dealing has re-
sulted, in general, in an absolute prohibition of such transac-
tions.45 In addition, the present rules are administratively un-
workable; it is virtually impossible to ascertain the facts neces-
sary to determine reasonableness.
46
Similarly, the problem of delay in benefits reaching charity
was attacked by banning unreasonable accumulations. 47 Again,
the problem of defining "reasonable," the liberality of the courts,
and basic administrative problems are used to prove the inade-
quacy of the present law.
48
Foundation involvement in business was treated in 1950 by
adding the provisions concerning "feeder" organizations, 49 and
unrelated business income. 50 But these provide specific excep-
tions51 which are used and often abused. And these provisions
do not even touch the subtle evils of business involvement men-
tioned previously.52
The problem of unrelated financial transactions was covered
generally by the Revenue Act of 1950. Thus, foundation borrow-
ing often is for the so-called "bootstrapping" sale-leaseback
transaction. Section 514 was specifically designed to cover these,
but often proves ineffective because of its exceptions; and of
course, it applies only to rental property. Foundation lending
which meets the objective tests of adequate security and reason-
able interest 53 usually cannot be attacked, even if in fact private
benefit exists, because of problems of proof.54 And speculation
by foundations, which is limited by section 504 (a) (3), is not
really curbed because of the general looseness of that section.55
44 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 17-18. Whimsically, the Report says,
"Indeed, the 'arms' involved may both belong to the same person who is
both donor and trustee." Id. at 18.
45 Id. at 18.
46 Id. at 20.
47 I. R. C. Secs. 504(a) and 681(c) (1954).
48 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 25-26.
49 I. R. C. Sec. 502 (1954).
50 1. R. C. Secs. 511 ff. (1954).
51 Probably the most significant exception is that under I. R. C. Sec. 514
(1954) pertaining to business leases.
52 Supra at note 12.
53 See quote at n. 43 supra.
54 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 51.
55 Id. at 53.
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Neither the self-perpetuation of foundation management nor
the use of foundations to control closely held property or corpo-
rations was specifically covered by the Revenue Act of 1950,
although of course, many specific problems would fit within one
or more of the above-discussed categories.
In short, the Revenue Act of 1950 has not solved the prob-
lems because it is too loose and difficult to administer.
The Treasury's Proposed Changes
In general, the Treasury suggests that the possible benefits
accruing to charity because of the relatively loose "reasonable"
standards imposed by the Revenue Act of 1950 are not worth the
cost. The proposals adopt absolute prohibitions of those transac-
tions and situations which do not measurably aid charity.
As mentioned before, the Treasury proposals are specifically
aimed at the particular problems. These will be discussed in the
same order as the problems were stated.
Transactions between foundations and their donors. The
donor (and certain other connected parties) would be prohibited
from entering into certain transactions with the foundation.5 6
These transactions would be similar to those presently "pro-
hibited" V except that the ban would be absolute; no exception
would be made for "reasonable" or "arm's length" transactions.
This proscription seems well warranted. Even if at "arm's
length," the ability to control both sides leaves too much room
for maneuvering. If, for example, a donor may borrow funds he
has just donated to his foundation, he has really not parted with
his property. He has the use thereof, and has bought a contribu-
tions deduction at the cost of (deductible) interest. While he
must repay the loan, he does control the situation, and his short
run advantage may well offset his long-term detriment.
The Treasury position is in agreement with general trust
law, which bans all transactions between the fiduciary and his
trust. This recognizes the unreality of determining reasonable-
ness in the self-dealing context; when one is representing his
56 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 21-23.
57 Under I. R. C. Secs. 503(c) and 681(b) (1954).
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own interest and also a fiduciary interest, it is unrealistic to as-
sume he will do justice to the fiduciary interest.5s
And, as the Treasury says, possibly with irony, ...... a party
who engages in transactions with the foundation on a truly
arm's-length basis could, by definition, engage in the same trans-
action, on the same terms, with strangers." 59
Delays in transmitting benefits to charity. The Treasury
proposes the simplest of solutions to the problem of delayed
benefits: require current distribution of income. 60 To avoid
hasty decisions and to permit investigation of possible expendi-
tures, "current" would be defined to mean not only the year dur-
ing which the income is earned, but also the following year.
Recognizing that certain projects require a sum greater than
one year's income, two exceptions are proposed. First, the foun-
dation will be permitted to treat as properly expended all funds
set aside for a definite, specifically stated, charitable purpose.
The actual expenditure must be made within five years (or some
other specific period), unless an extension is granted for good
cause. Second, if a foundation has invaded corpus for actual
charitable benefit, it would be permitted to recoup the amount
of this invasion by accumulating income for some specified pe-
riod (five years is suggested) thereafter. Either averaging de-
vice, or both, could apply to a given year.
To complement this distribution requirement, which could
be avoided by investment in non-income producing property, the
Treasury suggests an income equivalent determination. Thus,
using a rate to be set by Regulations, 1 a certain percentage of
the investment assets (i.e., those not actively devoted to charity)
would be deemed to be an "income equivalent." The amount re-
quired to be devoted to actual charity would then be the higher
of the actual income or this "income equivalent." 62 A reason-
58 No exception is made for the so-called "bargain sale" where the donor
sells appreciated property to the foundation for the amount of his basis,
making a gift of the appreciation only. These would no longer be allowed.
Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 22.
59 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 23.
60 Id. at 26-30.
61 The rate would vary as the market varied. A rate of 3 to 3 percent
would be a reasonable income equivalent rate at present. Id. at 28-29.
62 If there is a specific earmarking of funds, the "income equivalent" could
be set aside much the same as in the proposal with respect to actual income
accumulation. Id. at 29.
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able period would be allowed to existing foundations to adjust
their investments, before "income equivalence" would apply to
them.63
If charity delayed is charity denied, the Treasury proposals
have merit. Mandatory current expenditures for active charity
meets the general problem of delay simply and in an easily ad-
ministered way. Reasonable flexibility is provided by the two
averaging exceptions. The major criticism can be levelled at the
"income equivalent" proposal. Any attempt to base taxation on
fictional income is harsh. How could one differentiate the foun-
dation with an unlucky (or incompetent) investment adviser?
Must it be doubly penalized: once by the poor investment and
then by a required corpus distribution? Possibly a rebuttable
presumption would be better than the assumption that less than
three percent is abnormal, especially since the investment ad-
viser did not have the benefit of hindsight. With this modifica-
tion, "income equivalence" is desirable to assure inappropriate
delay in funds reaching the level of operating charity.
Active involvement in business enterprises by foundations.
Again the Treasury meets the problem by outlawing it.64 More
specifically, no private foundation would be permitted to own
twenty percent of the voting power, or twenty percent of the
equity, of any corporation65 conducting an unrelated business.6 6
Passive income (such as interest earned, mineral royalty pay-
ments, and "clearly passive" rents) would be deemed not to have
arisen from a business for this purpose.6T Present foundations
would be permitted a reasonable time to reach the permissible
maximum, which would be extended for good cause; and some
reasonable time for divestiture would be provided if some foun-
dation acquired more than the permissible holdings in the fu-
ture.68
63 Id. at 29.
64 Id. at 36-37.
65 Similar treatment would apply to non-corporate businesses in which the
foundation owns a 20% interest. Id. at 36.
66 The test of whether a business is or is not substantially related to the
foundation's exempt purpose would be quite similar to the present test un-
der I. R. C. Sec. 513 (1954). Id. at 37.
67 Id. at 36-37.
68 Id. at 37. The Treasury would waive divestiture as to pre-existing foun-
dations which could not divest themselves of this degree of control under
state law. Ibid.
May, 1965
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Although twenty percent is an arbitrary figure, it is prob-
ably as good a proportion as any to prevent the dominance of
business over charity. While a twenty percent interest may in
fact produce working control, when coupled with the other pro-
posals this proposal would do much to remove many non-chari-
table motivations from foundation management.
Use of foundations to control closely-held property or cor-
porations. Here two alternative proposals are made, either of
which would postpone the donor's contributions deduction in
certain circumstances.6 9 Since the transfer of an interest in
closely-held property (or of stock of a close corporation) to a
foundation lacks finality in fact, the donor would be denied an'
income, gift, or estate tax deduction 70 until one of three events
occurs: the foundation disposes of the assets, or the foundation
devotes the property to active charity, or the donor's control
over the property or corporation ends.
71
Control, for this purpose, will be presumed to consist of a
twenty percent interest in the property; 72 but this could be re-
butted by a showing that such interest in fact did not constitute
control. Attribution of ownership rules would apply, so that the
foundation's interest would be attributed the donor so long as
the latter owned any interest in the property at all.
7 3
Alternatively, the denial of a present deduction would occur
in those situations where the donor (and related parties) not
only control the property, as above, but also exercise "substan-
tial influence" over the donee foundation. This more limited
proposal would still cover the areas of conflicting interests where
both the property and the foundation were dominated by the
same related group.
As the Treasury notes, the more restrictive proposal is gen-
erally less desirable. Conflict of interest is not the only relevant
factor. For example, a gift of stock of a controlled corporation
to a non-controlled foundation is still subject to the dominion of
69 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 41-45.
70 Under I. R. C. Secs. 170, 2522, and 2055 (1954) respectively.
71 The qualifying event would have to occur within three years of the do-
nor's death, or the deduction would be lost. Treasury Report, supra note 1,
at 42.
72 Twenty percent of the voting stock would be the test for a corporation.
Ibid.
73 The attribution rules would also cover related parties. Ibid.
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the donor because of his control of the corporation; charity may
have no clearly defined present benefit from the stock. More
fundamentally, it is virtually impossible to come up with a work-
able definition of "substantial influence." A set percentage of
the foundation's governing body is the only feasible test of such
influence. Yet it could in no way deter a determined donor with
"friends" who are not in any related group, but who in fact
would be subservient. Indeed, unless they were quite careless,
two donors could make cross-donations to each other's founda-
tions and escape the penalty; discovering the facts would be dif-
ficult (if "planned properly"), and proof of a preconceived plan
might be difficult.7 4 In short, the Treasury's primary proposal
seems quite preferable.
Financial transactions unrelated to charitable functions. All
borrowing for investment purposes would be prohibited; but
they could properly borrow to further their exempt functions. 75
Similarly, foundations would not be permitted to make loans not
in pursuance of their exempt functions, with a few specifically
spelled out minor exceptions of a non-private nature. 76 In addi-
tion, foundations would be prohibited from using income or cor-
pus for any trading or speculation. 77
Little comment need be made about these proscriptions. A
charity should be restricted to charitable activities; it should not
engage in these types of transactions.
Self-perpetuating foundation management. It is proposed
that all foundations be operated by independent managers (i.e.,
not the donor or related parties) after twenty five years of exist-
ence. 78 That is, while the donor could maintain a significant mi-
nority voice, he would have to relinquish control within that
period.79
Not only would this proposal avoid the problems inherent in
self-perpetuation, but it would tend to protect the foundation
from abuse even within the period of donor dominance. Since
the "in group" would be certain of outside scrutiny (after twenty
74 Cf. Newberry's Estate v. Comm., 201 F. 2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953).
75 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 49-50.
76 Id. at 51-52.
77 Id. at 53-54.
78 Id. at 56-57.
79 Twenty five percent is the suggested maximum. Id. at 57.
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five years), their behavior within that period should be of a high-
er caliber and of higher utility to charity.
And the fresh views produced would tend to awaken any
foundation from the inertia of age.
Minor problems. As to contributions of unproductive prop-
erty, the Treasury proposes denial of a charitable deduction for
income, gift, and estate tax purposes,80 until the asset is either
made productive, or disposed of, or applied to charitable pur-
poses."' This should be correlated with the proposals discussed
above as solutions to the problem of the use of foundations to
control closely-held property, since the problems are similar.
To solve the problem of contributions of assets containing an
ordinary income component, the Treasury suggests using an ap-
proach similar to that used with respect to contributions of sec-
tion 1245 (or section 1250) property to charities: 82 reduce the
charitable deduction by the amount of ordinary income which
would have been realized if the property had been sold for fair
market value at the time of contribution.8 3
The "phantom" marital deduction base is avoided by a sug-
gestion to reduce this base by the amount of any interest in
property for which the donor has received an income tax de-
duction.
8 4
To promote the filing of information returns, in addition to
the criminal sanctions presently in force, the Treasury suggests
a penalty of ten dollars for each day beyond the due date up to
a maximum of $5,000. In addition, the responsible officials would
be subject to a similar penalty unless good cause for such failure
is shown. 5
Conclusions
The Treasury proposals offer a direct cure for each of the
evils discovered. Since the proposals would have few effects on
truly charitable activities, few legitimate complaints should be
heard.
80 Under I. R. C. Secs. 170, 2522, and 2055 (1954) respectively.
81 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 59-60.
82 Id. at 60-63.
83 1. R. C. Sec. 170(e) (1954).
84 Treasury Report, supra note 1, at 64.
85 Id. at 64.
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